

07 September 1940 Order of the Commander of the Norwegian Mountain Corps for the occupation of Petsamo in the event of an attack by the Red Army As stated in the preamble of the order, "...received the following order for the possible deployment "Renntier":" it is documented that the deployment was to be valid only for a possible eventuality. In readable form, the order given to the Gebirgskorps on 07 September 1940 is repeated here: Quote III.107 "1.) Order: rapid occupation of Petsamo and the nickel mines at Kolosjoki (12 km L stw. Svemrikus) while maintaining security of VarangerTanaPorsangenand all fjords." 269 The deployable forces (Cf. point 2. of the order.) were, however, very limited in view of the task set (occupation of Petsamo and securing the nickel ore mines and the fjords) and by no means capable of posing a threat to the Soviet Union. Securing the relocated troops on the Norwegian land route was exceptionally problematic, since the 810-km road from Narvik to Kirkenes could not be completed until early November 1940. In this situation, the Finnish government provided 50,000 tons of shipping space for the necessary supply shipments and allowed transit through Finnish territory from Kemi (Finland) to Kirkenes (Norway). It also permitted the transit of a German flak division in uniform. 270 Supply depots and shelters were set up along the transit route to ensure supply transports. 271 To avoid giving the impression of a deployment directed against the Soviet Union, the Finnish defense chief, in connection with the granting of transit rights, asked on September 16, 1940, that the Russians be informed of the German troop transit through Finland to Kirkenes.272 The transit of troops and supplies through Finnish territory to Kirkenes was regulated by a treaty between the Finnish government and the German Imperial Government on September 23, 1940. 273 Über eine alarming development informed the German Ambassador in Finland, von Blücher, in a letter to State Secretary von Weizsäcker in early August 1940, which, should such a suspected alliance of England with the Soviet Union come about, would not only seriously endanger the positions of the Wehrmacht in Norway, the nickel ore supplies from Petsamo, and the ore supplies from Kiruna, Sweden, but could fundamentally change the balance of power in Scandinavia. Quoting IH.108 the Finnish government finds itself in the situation of being pressured by the Russian side and harassed by the English side. Moreover, it fears that these two countries might come to an understanding and operate together against Finland on the Narvik-Petsamo-Murmansk line ...In this difficult situation, from the causal connection of which Germany cannot be entirely left out, the eyes of authoritative Finnish statesmen are turned to Berlin. "274 Summary of the reconnaissance of Soviet activities against Finland and the actions of the Wehrmacht to ensure security in the northeast 1. The reconnaissance of Russia's actions against Finland The growth of the situation, which was becoming more threatening to Finland, was, as evidenced by information from the Foreign Armies East and other timely reports from Attache and V-man intelligence as well as from Finnish reconnaissance organs (VgL above.), were known to the High Commands of the Wehrmacht, even though it was the information from the Estonian General Staff that first drew attention to the appearance of armored and mechanized units against Finland. It was also recognized, as evidenced by the large number of entries and their contents in the war diaries of the High Commands of the Wehrmacht, the Army and the Naval Command, that the unity of power-political demands of the Soviet Union, the attempts to seize the Petsamo area and the nickel ore deposits, the immediate military buildup and the use of the annexed territories testified to the expansion of Finland as a northern strategic flank. In Finland, these phenomena were perceived as a danger of imminent sudden Sovietization of the country, following the example of the Baltic states. As the Red Army documents cited in Table IIL101 prove, in August 1940 there was indeed a buildup of formations and the sudden appearance of Red Army armored and mechanized units in the Leningrad Military District and thus on the border with Finland. Also, Molotov's demands at the talks in Berlin on November 12-13, 1940, and his attempt to extract Hitler's consent to another war against Finland (the so-called Continuation War) retrospectively confirmed the reports received in July/August 1940. 2 The Wehrmacht's Preventive

Actions in the North of Scandinavia The German political and military leadership, which, as documented above, was very well informed about developments in the northeast, thus had every reason to be concerned about a possible confrontation with the Wehrmacht units stationed in northern Norway, about the threat to the supply of nickel ore from the Petsamo mines, and about iron ore shipments from Kiruna (insofar as they crossed the Gulf of Finland), and to initiate preventive security measures. The strategic military position on the northern flank of Germany for the fight against England and in the Gulf of Bothnia, quasi as a rear area as well as in the economic-political interest of Germany, did not allow any further advance of the USSR. Due to the lack of supply possibilities, the Wehrmacht concentrated limited forces from the inventory of the Army High Command Norway in Finnmark with the task of securing the Petsamo area in case of a Red Army attack. These few measures mentioned above were initiated only after the Soviet Union had informed the Red Army of its actions, and Operation "Reindeer", which served to secure the Petsamo area, had the character of a strike in anticipation of the Red Army's attack. The threat posed by the Soviet Union to Finland is recognized even by the established historiography, which states: "On August 21, Hitler expressed the desire to reorganize the 196th Infantry Division into a mountain division and to reinforce the SS brigade in northern Norway against Soviet pressure on Finland." ²⁷⁵ It should be emphasized that reports of the worsening situation in the north were received as early as mid-June to mid-July 1940 and thus contributed to the formation of Hitler's opinion and his well-known statements of 21 and 31 July 1940. Hitler's statements and hesitant determinations testify to the fact that a war in the East involving Finland was not envisaged at that time and that a plan did not exist.

3. confrontation with the historical fallacy The view that these measures should already be regarded as part of a deployment of the Wehrmacht against the Soviet Union is not tenable. Although established historiography accepts that there was an escalation of the situation in the northeast from mid-July 1940 onward, which brought Finland increasingly into the focus of German strategy, it is nevertheless claimed that "the starting point for all of Hitler's foreign policy and strategic decisions regarding Scandinavia and Finland from the summer of 1940 onward was his decision to begin preparations for his war against the Soviet Union, which was primarily ideologically motivated." ²⁷⁵ By not being able to avoid referring to truths about an expected violent coup by the Soviet Union against Finland, but at the same time claiming without any evidence that Germany had already expanded its northern flank for a war against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940, reveals the dilemma of the established historiography. That cause and effect are blatantly confused here has been demonstrated above by the chronological sequence of the reports received about the threatening situation developing in the north against Finland and the subsequent reactions of the political and military leadership in Germany. Obviously, here, too, there is a perverse reversal of the historical sequences by the established historiography. The Reconnaissance of the Red Army's Deployment in the Kiev Special Military District and the Preventive Deployment of the German Military Mission in Romania in the Fall of 1940 Brief Outline of Developments in the Balkans British attempts to win over the Soviet Union more strongly to the fight against Germany here had already become apparent in June 1940. Soviet attempts to gain increasing influence through Romania and via Bulgaria at the straits were also becoming apparent. ²⁷⁷ On June 28, 1940, after concentrating troops and issuing an ultimatum on June 26, 1940, the Red Army carried out what Russian documents called a campaign of annexation to occupy Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Despite its intention to keep the Balkan region free of disturbances, the German leadership had to take note of the fact that Stalin destabilized the entire Balkans with the military occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Immediately, Bulgaria and Hungary also made territorial demands on Romania for the return of the territories of Transylvania and South Dobruja, which had been seceded after the First World War. Thus, the already existing territorial problems in the Balkans became acute again. The fact that

Romania had

It is understandable that Romania felt threatened by the Soviet Union after the Soviet Union had taken away Bessarabia and the Red Army had advanced to the Pruth River, thus endangering other parts of the country, including the oil-producing region of Ploesti, which was important for German warfare. The first signs of Soviet-British cooperation were beginning to appear. One of these signals was the refusal of the British government, despite its declaration of guarantee, to stand helpfully by Romania in the face of Russian claims on Bessarabia and to extend them in the event of Soviet aggression. It is thus well founded that on 01 July 1940 King Carol II of Romania renounced the

French-British guarantee of his borders, which had become worthless, and on 02 July 1940 asked for a guarantee of the Romanian borders by Germany and for the dispatch of a German military mission to Romania.^{2,8} In a reply of July 15, 1940, to King Carol, Hitler demanded the fulfillment of revision demands by Bulgaria and Hungary before guaranteeing Romania and proposed direct negotiations between the contending countries. At Hitler's suggestion and his intention to settle the problems peacefully and prevent the war from spreading to the Balkans, negotiations with the Hungarian and Romanian delegations to settle this conflict began in Vienna on August 29, 1940, under the leadership of Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and with the participation of Italy's Foreign Minister, with an initially uncertain outcome. German interest focused on the area around Ploesti, which accounted for 98.7% of Romania's oil production. The deployment of the Red Army in the south and southwest of the USSR After the end of the Finnish campaign, Stalin's directive of April 4, 1940, transferred additional Red Army units to the Transcaucasian, North Caucasian, Odessa and Kiev Special Military Districts to reinforce the south and southwest directions in the strength of 2 rifle corps (in the inventory 6 rifle divisions), 1 cavalry division, 20 artillery troop units and 54 aviation squadrons. Thus, 24 rifle divisions were concentrated in the Kiev Special Military District and 10 in the Odessa.²⁷⁹ As a result of the occupation of Bessarabia on 28 June 1940 and the advance of the Red Army to the Pruth River, it moved to within about 170 km of Ploesti. With Stalin's directive of 04 July 1940 and Tymoshenko's directives of 06 July, the concentration of 31 divisions (25 rifle, 4 tank, and 2 motorized divisions) of the Red Army took place in the Kiev Special Military District and of 13 divisions (including 1 Mechanized Corps) in the Odessa Military District.²⁸⁹ The entire territory of Romania, thus including the Ploesti petroleum area, was within the radius of action of the Red Army's long-range bombing forces and, after the annexation of Bessarabia, now also well within the radius of action of the front-line air forces of the Kiev Special and Odessa Military Districts.²⁸¹ After the occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, the Naval Fleet continued to expand its naval dominance in the Black Sea, reinforced the Black Sea Fleet base in Odessa²⁸² and began to create a Danube flotilla. Reconnaissance of Red Army Actions Romania moved into the focus of German strategy as a result of this policy of Stalin's. Developments in Romania were closely watched in Germany, as evidenced by many entries in the war diaries of the high commands of the Wehrmacht and the Army and of the naval command. Another of Stalin's targets was southern Bukovina, which was to be annexed in the shadow of the Hungarian-Romanian crisis, as the enlightened deployment of Red Army units had proved. Thus, among other things, the naval warfare command stated on 05 July 1940 that the Red Army could advance further across the Pruth: "Soon further advance of the Russians feared. Goal: Bolshevization of the Balkans."²⁸³ The sense of a serious threat from the Soviet Union was made apparent by Hitler at the July 21, 1940, briefing: "England may see the following possibility: stir up trouble via Russia in the Balkans in order to deprive us of operational fuel and cripple our air fleet. Same purpose by setting Russia against us. Air attack on our hydrogenation plants." ²⁸⁴ (Cf. also quote IIL40.). Kinzel's note of conversation of 24 July 1940 (Document IH.43), which he presented to Halder on 26 July 1940, informed of the concentration of an alarming number of Koten Army units in the south of the Kiev Special Military

District and in the area of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. In Table IIL109 a comparison is made of the Red Army troops detected by German reconnaissance in this area with the numbers mentioned on the basis of Russian documents. The supplement of 01 August 1940 (document HI.44), prepared as a result of the communication of the Estonian General Staff by the Foreign Armies East, further increased the threat level to 35 calculation divisions (including 10 armored brigades). Major General Mareks, in his Operation Draft East of 05 August 1940 (Document III.70), also spoke about the possibility of an incursion into Romania with the aim of "... taking our oil" in the event of a warlike conflict. "

Lieutenant Colonel von Lossberg in his study of September 15, 1940 (Document III.83) also spoke of a possible "...Russian incursion against the Romanian oil area. " The reports of the German military attaché in Romania of 24 Z25 August 1940 about heavy shooting on the Soviet-Romanian border and the approach of two reconnoitered Russian divisions and a paratrooper regiment to the south indicated that Stalin was planning to annex southern Bukovina as well, as became known only through Molotov during the Berlin November talks, i.e., the area that Stalin had to renounce after German pressure at the end of June 1940. The message received by the High Command of the Wehrmacht on August 25, 1940, "Surprising news of Russian troop buildup on the Pruth. Invasion threat." 289 had attracted increased attention from Hitler and the OKW and led to the planning of a military intervention in the petroleum area to secure the Ploesti petroleum area (See below). The report arriving at the High Command of the Wehrmacht at about the same time about the stationing of 23 Hungarian brigades (out of 24 brigades in the total) on the border with Romania, facing only 8-10 Romanian divisions, while 22-24 divisions out of a total of 35 Romanian divisions were stationed on the Russian border, should have increased existing fears.²⁹⁰ Thus, it was now also reported on 26 August 1940, "Romania: worry that the Russian will also march again in the event of Hungarian invasion. Political considerations are wavering between 2 possibilities: Going with the Hungarians or giving Romania a guarantee against Hungary. "2^ This concentration of opposing Romanian and Hungarian troops indicated an imminent military confrontation between the two countries, especially since there was a series of border incidents on the Hungarian-Romanian border on August 28, 1940, which raised fears of increasing hostilities, while more Russian troops were being concentrated on the Prut River. Also, the Red Army deployment figures available in August 1940 (Document IIL66), issued on 09 September 1940 in the form of a reconnaissance information of the Foreign Armies East (Document 111.79), testify to a further threatening increase in the number of detected aircraft of the Red Army air forces from 5. 000 to a total inventory of 12,000 to 14,000. As shown above, messages were received behind which, Greiner writes, "...the intention of the Soviet Union was suspected of seizing the Romanian petroleum area in the event of an armed conflict between Hungary and Romania, which was to be prevented at all costs. " 292 30

August 1940 Planning for Military Intervention to Secure the Ploesti Petroleum Area In this situation of a doubly acute threat to the supplies of petroleum from Ploesti necessary for the continuation of the war against England, the High Command of the Wehrmacht held preliminary discussions on 30 August 1940 for military intervention to secure the petroleum area from occupation by a "third state" in the event that an agreement was not reached by arbitration. According to reports in the High Command of the Wehrmacht, the following forces were earmarked for this purpose: The Chief of Foreign Affairs/Defense reported to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Staff measures prepared by him for the protection of the oil area against acts of sabotage and hand-outs: "1. About 150 men with capable officers in Ruse on the Danube, about 150 men in Bucharest and in the oil area around Ploesti, ...; 2. About 6 Danube cutters and 2 motorboats with armament; 3. armed men in disguise on oil ships. " The Chief of the Operational Department of the Air Force Command Staff proposed to deploy 1 reinforced paratrooper regiment, in the inventory 3 battalions, 1 tank destroyer and 1 infantry gun company, 1 parachute flak and 1 light battery. 270 transport aircraft had been provided and another 230 would be

available within 72 hours. And the Ia of the Operative Department of the Army General Staff reported that from 01 September 1940 the XXXX. Army Corps under General Stumme with the 2nd and 9th Armored and the 13th Motorized Infantry Divisions could arrive in the Ploesti oil region within 5 days. 2 Infantry Divisions were to be made available to relieve the corps later. Also, the motorized infantry regiment "Großdeutschland" and the SS-Standarte "Adolf Hitler," currently in Alsace-Lorraine, could arrive at the German-Hungarian border within 96 hours. 293 It was on this basis that the further planning of the operation to secure the oil region around Ploesti was to be carried out. Hitler's goal of achieving final pacification of the Balkans and preventing an expansion of the war by Great Britain and interference by Russia led to the Vienna Arbitration Agreement of August 30, 1940. After this agreement was reached in Vienna and the situation in Romania calmed down, the immediate readiness of the troops intended for use in securing the Romanian oil area was lifted on September 10, 1940, and on September 12, 1940, the use of these troops for other tasks was released. 294 This fact must be understood as a planning episode for the implementation of a military intervention, which had its cause in the territorial claims of Hungary on Romania, combined with the concentration of Hungarian troops on the border with Romania, as well as the information received by the High Command of the Wehrmacht about a threat of invasion of northern Romania by Russian troops (message of August 25, 1940). The aim was to secure the oil area from the grasp of a third country, especially Russia, and not to plan a deployment against the Soviet Union. It is an exaggeration to claim that in the Vienna area, in the form of the XXXX. It is an exaggeration to claim that an "intervention reserve" was formed in the Vienna area in the form of the XXXX Army Corps, since Vienna-St. Pölten had been designated as the home base for the 2nd and 9th Panzer Divisions anyway. Apart from the planning activities for these divisions of the corps, no action was taken. The Deployment of a Military Mission in Romania For further processing of King Carol's request of 02 July 1940 for the dispatch of a German military mission to Romania, Lieutenant General von Tippelskirch, who had been sent to Bucharest, announced on 17 September 1940 in a telegram after a conversation with the Romanian Prime Minister Antonescu. In a telegram dated September 17, 1940, he said: "Romania continues to feel strongly threatened by its neighbors, especially by Russia, and is striving for recognizable external security through practical implementation of the German border guarantee. units under the cover of the military mission to be sent to Romania. The units in question are to be sent with full instructional personnel to train the Romanian troops tactically and technically in the use of the material. The material is to be turned over to Romania at a later date. " 295 In accordance with this request, increased deliveries of armaments to Romania occurred in the fall of 1940. 296 After repeated reminders and requests, including those from the Foreign Office and the German envoy to Romania, Hitler decided on 19 September 1940 to send a division supplemented by training troops to Romania. Teams and weapons, however, were not to be transported separately, as the Romanians wished. The Army High Command proposed sending a motorized division reinforced by tanks to Romania. On 20 September 1940, the Foreign Office was asked to prepare for the passage of German units through Hungary and to inform the Soviet Union of the sending of German troops to Romania. 298 The notification of the composition of the 13th Motorized Infantry Division for Romania, "13th mot.Div. without 2 Inf.Btl. reinforced by PzRgt. 4, 1 Corps Pi.Btl. with 2 Bridge Columns B, and 1 Corps Nachr.Abt. with a listening platoon. " took place on 30 September 1940, and their readiness in the area north of Vienna was to be ensured from 10 October 1940. 299 On 14 October 1940, the war diary recorded "German Wehrmacht mission (staff and pre-commando of Verf. only) Romania arrived in Bucharest on schedule and received enthusiastically," while Jagdstaffel and Flak-Abteilung were still en route. 300 But it was not until November 1940 that the 13th Panzer Division, formed in the fall of 1940 by reorganization and augmentation from the 13th Motorized Infantry Division, was transferred to Romania as a "training

force" to protect the oil fields around Ploesti. 301 The total strength was to arrive by 12 or 13 November 1940.³⁰² Although Hitler had been aware of Romania's request to send a military mission since 02 July 1940, he did not make his decision to send a reinforced division to Romania until 19 October 1940, after sufficient information was available on the threatening developments caused by the Soviet Union and the concentration of Red Army units (VgL above.). Lieutenant General von Tippelskirch's telegram of October 17, 1940, with an urgent appeal for help from the Romanian government formed a final impetus. The transfer of the 13th Panzer Division to protect the oil area around Ploesti took place in November 1940. There was no deployment of the 13th Panzer Division in the Wehrmacht's Balkan campaign. It continued to perform its protective role without interruption from December 1940 to April 1941, forming the reserve of the Army High Command in Romania. 303 The deployment of the armored division to participate in the German-Russian War from the Bucharest/Ploesti area with subordination under Army Group South to the Debica-Lublin area did not take place by rail transport until the end of May 1941 as part of Aufmarschstaffel 4b der Panzertruppen. Since the deployment of the 13th Panzer Division did not take place in the inventory of the 11th Army deployed in northern Romania in 1941, such a claim that the deployment of the military mission was already part of the deployment against the Soviet Union is not true. The opposite is true! The deployment of the 13th Panzer Division (home base Magdeburg) was not facilitated by the mission in Romania under the aspect of a later attack on the Soviet Union, but was made considerably more difficult by a much larger march distance from the area around Ploesti to the commanded concentration area Debica-Lublin, an in this direction insufficiently developed railroad system as well as necessary marching rights through Hungary and Slovakia. On December 10, 1940, the first order of the military mission, Site Order No. 1 (Cf. IV. Chapter.) was issued. It is thus evident that the military mission could not become effective until about the middle of December 1940. Also the concentration of Wehrmacht units in southern Romania (VgL IV. and V. chapters.), which took place at a later date, was not directed against the Soviet Union, but served the preparation of the Balkan campaign. That the infantry divisions of the 11th Army stationed in northern Romania along the Pruth River in the spring of 1941, some of which were returning from the Wehrmacht's Balkan campaign, are to be counted as part of the Barbarossa deployment cannot be denied. But it was not until the spring of 1941, after the end of the Balkan campaign. Thus, the thesis of the long-term beginning of the Wehrmacht's deployment already in the summer/fall of 1940 on the southern flank against the Soviet Union is clearly refuted. Summary of the Reconnaissance of the Threatening Situation in the Balkans and the Preventive Actions of the Wehrmacht 1. The Reconnaissance of the Threatening Situation in the Balkans As evidenced above by the excerpts from the war diaries and the reports of the Foreign Armies East, the German political and military leadership was always informed promptly and also with sufficient precision about the dangerous developments in the Balkans and the Soviet Union's share in them. It was Stalin who, by annexing Bessarabia and illegally occupying northern Bukovina on June 28, 1940, destabilized the entire southeastern European region, for it was only subsequently that Hungary and Bulgaria also made territorial claims on Romania. And he continued this policy by occupying three Danube Delta islands on October 26, 1940. In Chapter II, England's anti-German plans for the opening of a southern front in the Balkans were outlined, evidenced by the deployment of an expeditionary force in the Levant, already planned on July 17, 1939 (citations 11.15 u. 16). That the Balkans were assigned great importance in the plans of the Allied Supreme Military Council in the struggle against Germany was known to the political and military leadership of the German Reich at least since the La Charite files of 19 June 1940 (Document 111.36). As it became known later, Churchill hoped to be able to create an anti-German front of the Balkan states with 100 divisions against Germany (Document III.36) and to make possible a rapprochement of the Soviet Union with England. 2 The Actions of the

Wehrmacht The argument that Hitler provoked Stalin by supplying arms to Romania is not valid, since Stalin made his claim to Bessarabia public as early as March 1940, but the Arms–Oil Pact between Germany and Romania, which formed the basis for arms supplies to Romania, was not signed until May 27, 1940. The planning of an intervention of the Wehrmacht in the oil area of Ploesti on August 30, 1940 represented a planning episode in order to be able to counter a possible threat from third countries (possibly Hungary, Bulgaria, Soviet Union), which, however, remained without practical action by the Wehrmacht after the Vienna Arbitral Award. There is no connection between the Wehrmacht mission in Romania and the deployment of the Wehrmacht for the attack on the Soviet Union, which had only begun in February 1941.

the Soviet Union, but arose because of the Russian threat identified by the Romanian side (Cf. Telegram v. Tippleskirch.), later because of the threat of English bombardment (Document IV.120), and the German side's fear of a possible loss of Romanian oil supplies. This proves that the deployment of the German Army, Air Force and Navy mission did not serve the preparation of a campaign against the Soviet Union, but only to secure the area of Ploesti and thus the strategically important oil supply of Germany, especially since it is undisputed that the mission of the Wehrmacht was deployed after the requests of the Romanian King Carol as well as the further talks with Antonescu. Thus, the actions of the Wehrmacht in Romania considered above in this stage June–November 1940 were of preventive character. Thus, as Tippleskirch writes, "...a strong bar was to be put in the way of any further expansionist urge of the Soviet Union to the southeast." 304 3. The established historiography views the deployment of the military mission in Romania in an undifferentiated manner, not in accordance with the evolving historical situation, and always with the intention of presenting the actions of the Wehrmacht in the Balkans as parts of a long-term plan directed against the Soviet Union. Already obvious is General Warlimont's attempt, in connection with the dispatch of the military mission in 1940, to convince the Landesverteidigung (National Defense) Department of the

Wehrmacht's Joint Staff of a share of guilt in the preparation of the war against the Soviet Union and thus to construct a deployment of the Wehrmacht in the East that had already begun in the summer of 1940. Thus Warlimont, chief of this department, stated in his memoirs: "In addition, the share that fell to the WFStab in the fall of 1940 in the dispatch of "military missions " of the Army and the Air Force to Romania, which, as is known, was also part of the preparations for the Eastern campaign, may also be counted here." 335 If General Warlimont, in a prominent position as Chief of the National Defense Department in the Wehrmachtführungsstab, who should therefore know exactly, claims otherwise, it is probably due to an attempt to escape Allied punishment in postwar Germany. Possibly, however, he does not know it also so exactly, because the Wehrmacht Leadership Staff should have been hardly involved in the planning for the east campaign of the Wehrmacht according to his own explanations. Thus he stated on page 150: "The WFStab stood completely apart. " 306 Cause and effect are also confused when historians state, "The German confrontation strategy toward the Kremlin in southeastern Europe as well as in Finland–stemmed from Hitler's decision of July 31, 1940–to crush the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941." 307 It was the activities of Stalin, who pursued such a confrontational policy through his broad political advances in the Balkans, land seizures, and the military expansion of his southern flank. The Wehrmacht reacted. Further, one can read from Jürgen Förster: "As a result of the turn to the East decided by Hitler in the summer of 1940, Romania, along with Finland, came into the field of vision of German strategy." 308 As the sequence of events proves, at the time of the deployment of the military mission with training troops, a final (i.e., "unalterable") decision by Hitler to attack the Soviet Union did not even exist (Cf. the assessment of Hider's July 31, 1940, fessdegungen as a statement of intent.). 111.8 The Intelligence Contribution of the Abroad/Defense Division in the Eastern Direction The Abroad/Defense Division also provided a

number of important pieces of information, as the following selection of documents demonstrates. The war between the intelligence services of both sides had been going on for some time. Despite the objective difficulties for the activities of the Foreign and Defense Offices in the eastern direction (cf. Chapter I), the few documents show that a number of important reconnaissance results could nevertheless be obtained. Obviously significant were the reports of Abwehr Division III, responsible for espionage and counterespionage (documents III. 110), on the espionage orders of the Russian intelligence services, which allowed conclusions to be drawn about an increased need for information on directions, troop strengths and objects, etc., concerning the Wehrmacht. Also of interest should have been the reconnaissance order of the British intelligence service of 30 September 1940 (Document III.111) to clarify which formations were stationed on the German eastern border. However, it is not clear whether this was a case of cooperation between English and racial intelligence. The Abwehrstelle at the military commander in the Generalgouvernement reported through KoLuft border-related object-related certainly very important results, reconnoitered by the still limited reconnaissance air forces in the east, which were forbidden to fly over the border. Thus, the Abwehr reconnoitered the airfield of the racial air forces near Radawa, northeast of Jaroslaw, about 96 km northwest of Lemberg (Document III.113, Annex 2), etc., which was located directly on the demarcation line.

111.9 Hitler's Directive No. 18 of November 12, 1940 A deep insight into the world of thought of Hitler and the leading military officers is given by the extraordinarily significant Directive No. 18. It conveys ideas about the further conduct of the war but also a certain lack of conception of Hitler's military-political ideas at that time, the so-called "dead point" of his strategy. As late as 01 November 1940, Halder recorded in the war diary Molotov's willingness to come to Berlin for talks with the remark: "Führer hopes to be able to incorporate Russia into front against England." 311 Certainly Hitler would not have hoped to do so if, after his statement of July 31, 1940, he had been firmly willing to crush Russia. The foundations of Directive No. 18 of 12 November 1940 were laid in Hitler's meeting with Keitel, Jodi, von Brauchitsch, Halder, and others in Berlin on 04 November 1940. As a result of this consultation, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Joint Staff issued the following instructions to Department L for the new directive to be drawn up for the warfare, according to which the main content of the consultation was the determination of measures for the fight against England. Thus, the preparation of the deployment of German forces in Libya, the creation of conditions in the Balkans for the deployment of German air units against those British air bases from which the Romanian oil area could be threatened, as well as the reinforcement of the Army mission in Romania "... by 1 Geb.Btl. and 1 Geb.Battr. ...", reconnaissance against Gibraltar and the establishment of airfields on Spanish soil after a favorable course of political negotiations with Spain and the removal of Gibraltar as well as the simultaneous occupation of the Canary and Cape Verdian Islands, the serious further preparation of the enterprise "Sea Lion", since the possibility or necessity of returning to the enterprise in the spring of 1941 was not excluded. In addition, at Hitler's request, intentions of future cooperation with France were still to be included. References to or instructions for the allegedly long-planned military confrontation with the Soviet Union are not found in the records of 04 November 1940 in the War Diary of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, one will look for them in vain! It is different with Halder. Although there is a broad agreement in his transcript concerning the tasks outlined by Hitler for the fight against England, as the following quotation III.114 from his records proves, his doubtful attitude in this respect becomes nevertheless visible. Quote ULI 14 "5. Greece a) English attempts to create air bases in Lemnos and Salonika. (English) air defense service advanced on southern border of Bulgaria. Attitude of Turkey probably restrained (attempt to set Russia on Turkey.) c) Air force to prepare to destroy Greek island bases." 312 The tasks ahead of the army in the east and southeast were probably much closer to its interest. Thus, Halder also has the following entry: Quote IIL115 ■■ 6 Turkey rolls up problem of

Russia. This question can be considered only after Russia has been eliminated. If Bulgaria is driven south, Turkey can be kept at rest with Russia's help. Russia remains the whole problem of Europe. Everything must be done to be ready for the great reckoning. " 313 According to Halder's war diary, in order to provide flank protection against Turkey for his operations planned against the British air bases in Greece (seizure of Greek Macedonia and Thrace), Hitler is said to have uttered, " ...(attempt to set Russia on Turkey). " 314 And in an appendix to the war diary Halder writes further: Quote III.116 "For the Army's consideration it is decisive to what extent land forces will be permanently called upon and therefore drop out for the east and southeast area, which still demands full readiness from us. East-West Mediterranean area. England: Thessaloniki air base ? Lemnos ? Preparation Anatolia ? Political base ? East: lecture on bases ?" 315 Even after going through Halder's notes and his attachment to the war diary several times (citation HI.II 6) and comparing them with the

minutes of the consultation in the war diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, the impression remains that Halder, in his reproduction of the consultation of November 4, 1940, repeatedly mixed Hitler's explanations with his personal views. As evidence may be cited Hitler's contemplation of setting Russia on Turkey, while Halder believed rather in a continuing threatening development in the east and thought that the " ... Ostund Südostrum ..., still demands full readiness from us. " Hitler's hint at the consultation on 04 November 1940 in Berlin that the Soviet Union should be pressured to keep Turkey quiet is said to have given the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder, cause to ask what the political leadership was actually planning vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. And indeed, after this consultation of Hitler on 04 November 1940, this question is open. At the same time, he formulated to continue all preparations for the East, which had already been ordered verbally. Hitler's discussion with Keitel, Jodi, von Brauchitsch, Halder and others on 04 November 1940 is an example of the strategic lack of conception in the fall of 1940. From deployment in Libya, Gibraltar, the Canary Islands (or Azores), moving into Portugal, into Turkish Thrace, Russia as well as "Sea Lion", everything was supposed to be possible. Even if Hitler is said to have formulated " Russia. Remains the whole problem of Europe. Everything must be done to be ready for the great reckoning," nevertheless, the participants of the meeting had to get the impression that Hitler had not yet made an unalterable decision to attack Russia, because Halder recorded in the result of the consultation: " No concrete decision against Russia yet. " Above all, however, the discussion with Molotov was still to come. In the evaluation of the Führer's meeting conducted with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army on 04 November 1940, Halder then also stated: " a)

Preparations East continue. b) Preparations Sea Lion continue. c) Spain preparations:.... " Thus the purpose of Halder's lecture, "to ask for a decision on the great intentions to be served by the Army's preparations. " 316 was not achieved. Hitler's determinations of 04 November 1940 were recorded by the Wehrmacht Fiihrungsstab in the following Directive No. 18 (Document III. 117) of the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, issued on 12 November 1940: Since Russia's figures given in the above table are difficult to read, they are presented here again. The strength of the Red Army was assessed by Army Group B, probably as an expected value for January 1941, as follows: This request by Army Group B to the Army High Command concerning the character of the further expansion of the national defense east, actually a trivial document, is significant for our considerations in several respects: 1. In Army Group B's order to the armies of 18 October (Document IIL89), it had been ordered that the command authorities, staffs, and troops be transferred to a state of rest and that the task of conducting training and expanding accommodations be set. On special instructions, military protection of the German-Russian border was to be taken over. The proposals of Army Group B for the further development of fortifications in the Generalgouvernement and in the area of the Stellv. Gen. Kdo. I. AK are thus consequential acts of its security mission and confirm the defensive character of the mission

given to the Army Group in the east/southeast directions. 2 Although this request confirms the generally defensive mission of Army Group B, it was stipulated (Document III.89, Pt III.) that, if required, the deployment of Army Group B should be carried out, but this was to be ordered separately. This deployment, too, would have required reliable security and defense, i.e., the expansion of the security installations. 3 From the questioning of the Chief of the General Staff of Army Group B concerning the construction of "limited resistant installations" (Document IV.7, last paragraphs.), however, speaks the uncertainty about the character and possible necessity of the further actions of Army Group B. Summary November 1940 1. It is obvious that the talks held in November 1940 with Molotov, whose demands, presented in presumptuous form, echoed Stalin's views, confirmed the intentions expressed by Hitler on July 21 and 31, 1940, and constituted another stage in the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union. 2 Let us take the delivery of maps of the road network of Yugoslavia (Document IV.3) as an indication that the units of Army Group B were not yet made available for an offensive against the Red Army but, in accordance with their general mission, were to ensure the security of the Reich in the east and southeast and, if necessary, were to be prepared to be deployed in the Balkans. The reason for their deployment was not only the landing of the British in Greece but also Stalin's Balkan policy (cf. IIL chapter.). Evidence is the planned later withdrawal of 5 divisions from the eastern security to the 12th Army planned for Balkan deployment (Document IV.119). 3 The gas war preparations of the Red Army (Document IV.4) The fact that the Red Army was conducting research and intensive training in the field of chemical weapons was probably not unknown to the Wehrmacht, since there were a number of training areas in the south of the Soviet Union that had formerly been used by the Reichswehr. The number of facilities for the production of poison gas, their enormous monthly production as well as the structures corresponding to a modern army up to the level of the rifle regiments created for the use of poison gas and before its protection, however, should have been a surprise for the high command of the Wehrmacht. Also, 1t. this reconnaissance report, overcoming contaminated terrain sections was a frequent exercise element used during exercises and maneuvers by Red Army units and formations. 4. information of Army Group B units stationed in the east (Document IV.6) As this reconnaissance document shows, the strength of the Red Army was not considered exclusively, but, as was customary among the military, a general survey was made of the army strengths of the states in the eastern and southeastern areas. The data on the total strength of the Red Army of 200 computational divisions and of 12,000 to 14,000 aircraft of the air forces corresponds to the reconnaissance results of 09 September 1940 of the Foreign Armies East (Document III.79) and has undoubtedly been adopted by them. Nevertheless, it speaks of uncertainty about the actual strength of the Red Army existing at the time, i.e., in November 1940, which, according to the above-mentioned survey, could be between 2 and 11-12 mill. According to the Russian documents, the personnel strength of the Red Army (excluding the naval fleet) in January 1941 was already 3.8 mill soldiers. Also concerning the number of armored and motorized units or mot.mech. brigades, the question mark indicates ambiguity. However, the documents, in which armies of other states were considered in addition to the Red Army, prove above all that in the reconnaissance organs there was not yet a concentration of reconnaissance on the Soviet Union and the Red Army, one of the indications according to which in the fall of 1940 the Soviet Union was not yet considered an enemy state, at least in the troops, but also reflected the increasing pressure of the Soviet Union on the Balkans, which forced the reconnaissance organs to turn more attention to the Balkans. IV.3. December 1940 Hitler's preliminary decision to carry out Barbarossa; the reconnaissance information available to the Wehrmacht The following information of the Foreign Armies East, submitted with the status at the beginning of December 1940, is also to be understood as an indication of the contradictorily developing situation in the Balkans, which, according to Hitler's will, was to be kept out of warlike actions, but

which, nevertheless, was gradually developing, at the instigation of Stalin and England, into a danger area for German interests and security in the southeast. This document confirms the increased turn of *Fremden Heere Ost* toward reconnaissance of the forces of the Balkan states. The total of 81 reconnoitered infantry divisions of the armies of the Balkan states alone represented a considerable fighting force, which was sufficient reason to keep the Balkans peaceful, even if, as the political development showed, a united action of these countries against Germany was not to be expected and the technical fighting means of the few motorized and armored troop elements and units (780 armored fighting vehicles) as well as the total of 1790 airplanes were mostly obsolete. Nevertheless, this information convincingly proves the reconnaissance activities of the Foreign Army East, which was also active in the Balkans. The above-mentioned assessment of Document IV.7 of November 20, 1940, is supported by the contents of the following addendum to the application of Army Group B for the expansion of the intelligence system (Document IV.9) with regard to the defensive mission but also with regard to the obvious lack of precise guidelines. 05 December 1940 Hitler's Consultation with the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff of the Army In Hitler's consultation on 05 December 1940 with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch, and the Chief of the General Staff, Halder, a number of preliminary decisions were made,

which Halder recorded in the war diary as follows: Quote IV.10 "Result: Felix as soon as possible. Latest Felix day 10.1.1941. There should be as short a period as possible between the first airborne overhead and the beginning of the artillery attack. The decision on Felix is firm [Hitler's statement]. larita: Carry out preparations fully according to proposal so that invasion of enemy territory can take place early in March. The decision on Marita is still reserved. Otto: Fully initiate preparations in accordance with the basis of our planning. Intended time: end of May [1941]. (Otto early designation for Barbarossa the author) Sea Lion: can be left out of consideration. Libya: can no longer be considered. 10.1 The war aims laid down in Directive No. 18, Warfare for the Near Term, of 12 November 1940, were thus specified by Hitler on 05 December 1940 and the further emphases determined. Seelöwe" was now to be "left out of consideration", although in Instruction No. 18 it was still stipulated " ... to improve the foundations for such an enterprise in every respect. " ...Sunflower," support for the Italians in North Africa was also to be "out of the question." Felix," however, i.e., the taking away of Gibraltar, was to be carried out in January 1941, and "Marita," the Balkan campaign against Greece in support of the Italians, to drive the British back from Greece, and to avert the air threat from Ploesti, was to be carried out in March 1941. With these determinations, absolute priority was assigned to the fight against England, not only in terms of time but also in terms of the use of forces. The fact that the decisions mentioned in quotation IV.10 could only have been preliminary decisions by Hitler, not final ones, is shown by the later dismissal before. "Felix" and the mission in Libya that was carried out after all, contrary to the cancellation of the mission. This statement should also apply to "Otto". The wording "fully initiate preparations in accordance with the fundamentals of our planning", which refers to the execution of "Otto", the campaign against the Soviet Union, implies the consideration that up to now only the fundamentals of the planning were to be worked out and now the release for the preparation of "Otto" was given

and that these preparations were now to be fully initiated. But this corresponded exactly to Halder's note after the evaluation of the consultation with Hitler on July 21, 1940 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch: "8th Russian problem to be tackled. Make mental preparations. " (Quote III.40). This remark "Preparations ... set in motion" of 05 December 1940 (citation IV.10) thus also degrades the 1t. of the established historiography of Hitler on 31 July 1940 allegedly taken decision for a war against the Soviet Union to a statement of intent. For a decision did not yet exist. The statements on "Otto" quoted in the following were assigned to Hitler by the editor of the war diary: Quote IV. 11

(excerpt) "3. Details [on] Otto [Hitler's statements]: a) It is a matter of preventing the enemy from evading. b) Farthest goal: To take hold of security area because of air attack on the homeland. After reaching this goal, combined actions to destroy enemy sources of power. (Armament industries, mines, oil wells). (c) Purpose of operation: destroy Russian living force: bodies capable of regeneration may no longer exist. (d) Participants: Finns, Romania. Hungary not. e) Bring in one division from Narvik by rail through Sweden and deploy with 2 Mountain Div. Dietl together on north wing. Target: Arctic Ocean. f) Strong forces to the south group! Russian must be beaten forward of Dnieper. Air force on Dnieper crossings! What stands of the Russian forward of the Dnieper must be destroyed. g) Cut off Baltic area! Then suffice there Landwehr-Div. [= 3rd wave Div.]. h) By strong wings north and south of the Pripjet marshes the enemy must be torn apart and enclosed in partial kettles (similar to Poland). These two outer wings must be fast and strong! i) Moscow not very important [Hitler's view], " 11 These statements by Hitler prove that now planning based on his instructions and further preparations are to be pushed ahead in earnest. After returning from the meeting, Halder prepared the following transcript contained in his war diary and excerpted here: ..notes (Halder's the author) from the meeting with the Fuehrer on 5. 12. 1940, 3 p.m. 3. ... Any weakening in the Axis position will lead to an advance by the Russians. They cannot of themselves dictate to us the law of action, but they will take advantage of every opportunity to weaken the position of the Axis. 16 Russia: The campaigns so far prove that attacks must be launched at a favorable time. The favorability of the time depends not only on the weather, but also on the mutual ratio of forces, armament, etc. The Russian is inferior to us in arms, as is the French. He has few modern field batteries, everything else is replica material. Our Panzer III with 5 cm cannon (1500 in the spring) gives us clear superiority. The mass of Russian tanks is poorly armored. The Russian man is inferior. The army is leaderless. It is more than questionable whether the correct findings of the military leadership in the army, which have been noted occasionally lately, will be evaluated. The internal reorientation of the Russian army will not be better in the spring. We have in the spring a visible peak in leadership material, troops, the Russians an unmistakable low. Once this Russian army beaten !: t, then the disaster is unstoppable. " 12 The authenticity of a number of statements in this record, which Halder himself described as a memorial record made after the fact in his war diary (" After returning in the evening, discussion of the result with Heusinger. Transcription of the minutes of the meeting." 13) must be doubted, especially since a somewhat different record was not recovered until after 1950. This rediscovered document (quotation IV.13) about Halder's lecture and about Hitler's remarks does not contain these negative representations. Nor is such an assessment found in the Handbook on the Red Army (Document IV.25) issued somewhat later on January 15, 1941, by the Foreign Armies East. "The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then gives a lecture on the planned Eastern operation. He first spreads over the geographical bases. ... The area north of the Pripjet marshes therefore seemed to be more heavily occupied with troops than the southern part. The Russian distribution of forces also shows a strong massing along the Russian-German border of interests. It can be assumed that the Russian supply base, protected by field fortifications, is located close to the east of the former Russian-Polish border. (This is followed by Halder's reflections on the execution of the operation of the Verf.) The Fuehrer declares himself in agreement with the operational intentions presented and adds the following: The most important goal, he said, was to prevent the Russians from falling back in a united front. The advance must be carried out in such a way to the east that the Russian air force can no longer attack the German territory and that the German air force, on the other hand, can carry out raids to destroy the Russian armament areas. By this means the destruction of the Russian Wehrmacht had to be achieved and its regeneration prevented. ... "14 When comparing this original protocol, which only surfaced in 1950, with the memorial protocol prepared in the war diary after the discussion by him, the suspicion is obvious that an attempt was to be made to add some lower racial

ideological motives, such as those of German superiority over the "...inferior Russian man" etc., to the increasingly urgent preventive strike project. Also in this 1950 document (citation IV.13) statements were made which again illustrated the dangerousness of the situation in the East. While one does not have to comment on the statement "... strong massing after the Russian-German border of interest...", since this could be taken from any reconnaissance information of the Foreign Armies East, it should be noted with regard to the remark "densely eastward of the former Russian-Polish border protected supply base of the Russians": These supply bases and camps for securing the operations of the Red Army fronts and armies, located far from the border, were thus reconnoitered by the Wehrmacht at an early stage and were already known to the Army High Command in December 1940. However, the location of the main supply depots of the armies far from in the tactical defense zone is one of the indications of possible offensive intentions of the Red Army. In fact, they were located at a depth of only 35 to about 220 km.¹⁵ According to this document, the statements of Hitler, who agreed with the intentions presented by Halder, testify to the air threat from the east, which had already been identified several times. The Army General Staff also had at its disposal a large number of statements and indications which contradict the negative picture of the condition of the Red Army drawn here in an undifferentiated manner, which must have been known to Halder, but also to Hitler, and which the Red Army

and which describe the Red Army as a thoroughly dangerous force. Only a few details known to the high commands of the Wehrmacht and the Army and already noted in Chapter III concerning the increasingly dangerous developments in the East will be repeated here: Operations Draft East by General Mareks of 05 August 1940 (Document III.70): The total number of Russian divisions was given as 198. "The Russian air force is an ernstzunehmender opponent, ..." "The Russian navy is superior to ours in surface ships and submarines." Aufklärungsinformation der Fremden Heere Ost, 09 September 1940 (Document III.79): The total number of Russian divisions was given as 200, the number of divisions concentrated in the western frontier military districts as 120, the strength of the Red Army air forces as 12,000-14,000 aircraft, the radius of action of heavy bomber units as 1,500 km. The armament industry, it was reported "...will be able today in its entirety to supply the Red Army with the necessary war equipment at the beginning of a war" and "...railroads underestimated by us so far." Operations Study East by Lieutenant Colonel von Lossberg, September 15, 1940 (Document III.83): "The war army should already exist in its framework."; "... forward of the Dnieper particularly strongly developed ground organization of the Luftwaffe." In assessing the deliberations of December 5, 1940, it goes without saying that Molotov's presumptuous political demands in the Berlin talks of November 12-13, 1940 (cf. above), which testify to the will to expand westward, must not be disregarded. Let us therefore note that the political leadership of the German Reich and the military leadership in the High Commands of the Wehrmacht and the Army were aware of the threatening situation developing in the East at the time of the consultations of December 5, 1940. 13/14 December 1940 Halder's Evaluation of Hitler's Consultation of 05 December 1940 with the Army Group and Army Commanders The Halder-led evaluation of Hitler's consultation of 05 December 1940 with the Army Group and Army Commanders on 13/14 December 1940, in which the broad range of all possibilities was touched upon, reflected the uncertainty about the next military measures. Halder stated, among other things, "Decision on hegemony in Europe will be made in the struggle against Russia. Therefore preparation, if political situation requires it, to go against Russia. (Involved services get orders!) For us war on one front for which 130-140 Divn. must be available from spring [1941]. We do not seek conflict with Russia, but from spring 1941 must be ready also for this task. Operations Division notes: 1. Consequences from military-political situation: sea lion Gibraltar everywhere Possibilities Rest-France possibilities which must be prepared Bulgaria. Russia Political uncertainty still possible for a long time,

therefore mobile."... 16 By no means was a campaign against the Soviet Union already presented by Halder as a fixed figure but considered as a possibility " ... if (the author's) political situation requires it. "But according to Halder's words, the preparation should be forced. That there was not only the frontal Red Army deployment threatening the German Reich in the East, but the reasonable assumption of the development of a dangerous situation provoked by the Soviet Union in Scandinavia and the Balkans, possibly in conjunction with the main enemy, England, will be substantiated in the following. The Development of a Double Threat Situation in Scandinavia and the Balkans by the Soviet Union and England While the concentration of quantitatively far superior Red Army forces in the border military districts of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis East Prussia and the Generalgouvernement continued at a high level, the military-political situation for Germany was substantially aggravated by British and Soviet actions in Scandinavia and the Balkans in the run-up to Hitler's decision of December 18, 1940. According to the documents, in the fall of 1940/winter of 1941 Scandinavia increasingly developed into a region of unrest, threatening danger against Germany's northern flank. England's goal was to push back Germany's influence in Scandinavia, disrupt coastal shipping along the Norwegian coast and iron ore shipments from Kiruna, and cut off supplies to Wehrmacht formations in northern Norway, Stalin's goal was to expand the northern flank of the Soviet Union by incorporating Finland into the Soviet sphere of power after military occupation, seizing the port and nickel ore mines of Petsamo, establishing a dominant role in the Gulf of Bothnia, and releasing the Baltic Sea outlets (Molotov's demands on 12. /13 November 1940). The Soviet Threat to Finland After the moderate results of the Winter War against Finland, Stalin now planned to strengthen his northern flank and to revise the results of the Winter War (Cf. IIL Chapter.). The operational plan of the General Staff of the Red Army for this aggression against Finland, called "Continuation War," was submitted by the People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR, S. Timoshenko, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, K. Merezhkov, to Stalin on September 18, 1940, and confirmed by him on October 05, 1940. In this operational plan is formulated in pt. 4 (Cf. citation III.100.), " ... to take away the port of Petsamo and close the Norwegian land border in the Petsamo-Nautsi section in the first stages of the war. "17 It should come as no surprise, then, that the subject of Finland figured prominently in Molotov's discussions with Hitler on 12V13. November 1940 formed a decisive reason for their failure. After all, this is sufficient proof that the German side was aware of Stalin's will to continue his conquests in Scandinavia. Despite the strict rejection of such aggression expressed by Hitler in these talks, on November 25, 1940, the People's Commissar issued an instruction to the commander-in-chief of the Leningrad Military District to begin working out a plan for the deployment of the troops of the Northern Front. However, the occupation of the Norwegian land border in the Petsamo-Nautsi section, mentioned in the operational plan of the General Staff of the Red Army of September 18, 1940, would have meant the establishment of a direct line of confrontation with the Wehrmacht units stationed in northern Norway. Even if the above-mentioned operational plan of the General Staff of the Red Army was not known to German reconnaissance, these military ambitions of Stalin could be reconnoitered at an early stage by Fremden Heere Ost. Already the reconnaissance information of 09 September 1940 (Document IIL79) had established against Finland a concentration of more than 19 divisions, including 4 motorized rifle divisions and several mechanized brigades (Table 111.81) of the Red Army. Recall also the information provided by the German military attaché in Moscow, General Köstring, on July 11, 1940 (Citations L26), although his other conjectures expressed in this connection were inappropriate. Threat to Norway from British Interference and Landing Operations Although Hitler did not initially assume the conduct of British operational landing attempts in Norway, he was convinced that local tactical interference raids by the British should be expected at any time. The threat posed by Britain in the north became particularly apparent in view of the imminent start of iron ore shipments from Kiruna

(Sweden) from Lulea to Narvik (473 km) and, after ship loading, by sea transport along the Norwegian coast to Germany. Generaloberst von Falkenhorst and Reichskommissar Terhoven, who had recognized this danger in time, therefore proposed already on 09 December 1940: "1. 1 Bail. Waffen-SS to be transferred to Oslo..., 2. Lfl. 5 (Luftflotte 5 of the author) to be strengthened again by 1 destroyer and 1 Stuka-Gr. for the purpose of better protection of coastal shipping, 3. the coastal shipping security service to be strengthened by further light surface forces and the coastal defense to be strengthened by installation of further coastal batteries. " 1 ° In view of these developments (possible tactical landings of English units in Norway and disruption of coastal shipping, as well as military action by the Red Army against Finland), the possibility of the Soviet Union joining forces with England could no longer be ruled out. The Soviet Threat in the Balkans On October 26, 1940, the Red Army occupied three Danube Delta islands at Ismail, arguing that they belonged to Bessarabia, and a rapidly deployed armed Danube flotilla moved into the main Danube Delta port of Ismail (Document IV25), creating for Stalin an extraordinarily precarious situation in Romania directed against Germany. The fact that this operation was immediately reconnoitered and reported can be seen in the following entry in the war diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht of October 28, 1940: "Russians proceed to occupy the Danube Delta Islands. 4Camouflaged Russian officers arrived at Russian legation in Bucharest, for observation of German troops in Romania. "19 This action by the Soviet Union was especially worrisome since the Wehrmacht mission being prepared did not arrive in Romania until 12/13 November 1940 and, as evidenced by the following Order No. 1 (Document IV.17), was ready for work from about mid-December

1940 it was ready for work. 10 December 1940 Issuance of Order No. 1 of the German Wehrmacht Mission in Romania Without analyzing the operational idea of this instruction, it is necessary, from the point of view of this study, to answer the question of what indications the instruction gives us about the state of the Wehrmacht's reconnaissance of the Red Army. To this end, the author is of the opinion that the results of reconnaissance in the direction of the East considered so far, the potential danger building up but also directed against Scandinavia and the Balkans, Stalin's aim to disturb interests of the German Reich that were important for the war, the escalating air threat and a multitude of other indications and clues prove that such a claim that Hitler and in the High Command of the Wehrmacht were not aware of any danger from the Russian side is false. In the end, the whole operational idea of Plan Barbarossa proves that, even if not every detail was known, the march of the Red Army was cleared up. 25 December 1940 Order of Orientation Material by Army Group B Even though Army Group B was built up after recognizing a number of threat signals from the east with the aim of increasing security against Red Army incursions, this order by Army Group B (Document IV24) proves that an operation of the dangerously developing situation in the Balkans was also contemplated, as indeed it was later with parts. Summary December 1940 1. Sufficient knowledge about the potential enemy When the instruction speaks of " precautionary measures ", everyone recognizes that there must have been reasons to be cautious. This touches on the knowledge of the potential enemy, of Stalin's policies and intentions, of the Soviet Union and of the Red Army, which demonstrates the quality and extent of the reconnaissance carried out by the German reconnaissance organs. The reconnaissance results achieved despite the difficulties described are the content of the entire study in their historical sequence and will not be presented again here. In any case, one must emphasize the reconnaissance of the concentration near the border of the mass of Red Army units already in the war structure and filled up close to the war, the reconnaissance of the forward deployment of extensive bomber forces, which led to the realization of an acute air threat to German centers, the reconnaissance of substantial Red Army forces against Finland and in Bessarabia in connection with political demands and threatened peripheral actions of the Soviet Union in Scandinavia and the Balkans, and thus the threat to Petsamo and Ploesti, the

signals of a covert turn toward England, and so on. etc. The war diaries and existing documents prove it. Let us simply state: the results of reconnaissance on the most diverse channels were already available in December 1940 to such an extent and in such quality that the initiation of the "precautionary measures" mentioned in Instruction No. 21 seems more than justified. 2 Hitler's decision to prepare for the Eastern campaign, not to carry it out Thus, Instruction No. 21 Fall Barbarossa states: ..All orders to be taken by the gentlemen in chief on the basis of this instruction must be clearly coordinated to the effect that they are precautionary measures in the event that Russia should change its previous attitude against us. " (S. 8). This

establishes a dependence on the attitude of the Soviet Union and thus sets up a necessary condition for the conduct of the campaign, i.e., a change in Russia's previous attitude toward Germany. Implicit in this formulation is also that consideration should be given at a later date to whether the attitude of the Soviet Union has really changed. Instruction No. 21 can therefore be interpreted only as a preliminary decision, for Hitler's so-called "unalterable decision" is in any case not discernible here. 3. the lie of the established historiography of the march of the Wehrmacht begun in the summer of 1940 Not only the following formulation of the instruction No. 21: "I will order the march against Soviet Russia, if necessary, eight weeks before the intended beginning of the operation. " (p. 3) but also the practical implementation of the Wehrmacht's march in the East, which was initiated by the marching order of 31 January 1941 and began in February 1941, contradicts the view of established historiography that the march had begun in the summer of 1940. Obviously for everyone, this also disproves the fact of a war of aggression prepared long in advance. Thus, the findings made in the IIL chapter are also confirmed, namely that the deployment of the 18th Army in the summer of 1940 served only to restore the security in the East, which had been limited during the Western campaign, and that the formation of Army Group B in the late summer/fall of 1940 became necessary because of the concentration of large parts of the Red Army in the western border military districts of the Soviet Union, i.e. because of the development of a threatening situation.